Soundcraftsmen phase control regulation pcr 800

De Fraja and Iozzi (2008) conceptually discuss the possibility of adjusting PCR for quality, whereas Currier, 2007a, Currier, 2007b suggests some practical guidelines in that respect. The relevant literature on service quality, as surveyed in Sappington (2005), reinforces the case for explicit quality regulation. telecommunications that provides evidence of service quality deterioration under PCR. Resende and FaГ§anha (2005) consider the complexity of quality to be characterized by multiple attributes and undertake an efficiency-frontier analysis of U.S. telecommunications that provide overall quality indicators that would go beyond pass-fail standards and allow to reward superior quality performance. This research suggested the possibility of constructing weighted quality indexes in the context of U.S. 1 The evidence highlights the multidimensional character of service quality that was earlier emphasized, for example, by Lynch et al. In contrast, Uri (2004) found some evidence of quality deterioration for selected indicators after the introduction of incentive regulation for access pricing. Banerjee (2003), on the other hand, investigates the referred sector in terms of 12 service quality indicators and does not find evidence of quality degradation under incentive regulation. telecommunications, but the results are mixed depending on the quality indicator. The potential deterioration of service quality motivates the study by Sappington (2003) of U.S. The aforementioned researchers contend that quality degradation could justify adjustments in the X-factor but do not elaborate the issue in detail. Moreover, it is important to stress that despite its efficiency-inducing properties, a potential side effect of PCR is degradation of service quality. In actual regulatory practice, the setting of the so-called X-factor is not trivial given issues pertaining to the limited span of regulatory control, structural change in the regulated industry, endogeneity in the economy-wide inflation rate and imperfect competition in the economy (see Bernstein and Sappington, 1999, 2000). ДЄ key element in the implementation of PCR is the productivity offset, which should properly capture sector-specific expected productivity changes. In fact, the gradual prevalence of price-cap regulation (PCR) in preference to traditional rate-of-return regulatory regimes reflects a consensus with regard to the purportedly superior incentive properties of the former regime. The regulation of utilities has increasingly converged towards mechanisms that are expected to be more conducive to productive efficiency.

Soundcraftsmen phase control regulation pcr 800